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Multi-User Cooperative Computation Framework
Based on Bertrand Game
Nan Zhang, Guopeng Zhang, Kezhi Wang and Kun Yang
Abstract—In this paper, a multi-user cooperative computing
framework is applied to enable mobile users to utilize available
computing resources from other neighboring users via direct
communication links. An incentive scheme based on Bertrand
game is proposed for the user to determine who and how
to cooperate. We model the resource demand users as buyers
who aim to use minimal payments to maximize energy savings,
whereas resource supply users as sellers who aim to earn
payments for their computing resource provision. A Bertrand
game against buyer’s market is formulated. When the users have
complete information of their opponents, the Nash equilibrium
(NE) of the game is obtained in closed form, while in the
case of incomplete information, a distributed iterative algorithm
is proposed to find the NE. The simulation results verify the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Cooperative computation framework, Task of-
floading, Resource allocation, Bertrand game, Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) ap-plications, Virtual Reality (VR) services and others, the
computational complexity of mobile applications is increasing
rapidly. Although cloud computing can alleviate the shortage
of computing resources for user equipments (UEs), it may
incur longer transmission delay. To reduce latency and increase
user experience, the framework of multi-user cooperative
computing has been proposed to enable UEs to offload their
computational-intensive tasks to other neighbouring UEs via
direct communication links [1].
In the cooperative computing framework, UEs are generally
divided into resource demand UEs (DUs) and resource supply
UEs (SUs). DUs have heavy computing tasks and may require
other devices to assist, while SUs have available resources
and may help others. In [2], the authors considered that a
DU can partition a computing task into multiple parts and
offload the task parts to a set of SUs. The purpose was to
maximize the completion rate. The authors in [3] proposed an
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energy-efficient task offloading method for two cooperative
UEs and the aim was to minimize the long-term energy
consumption of both users. In [1], the authors proposed a
hybrid task offloading framework for fog computing, where
UEs can choose flexibly from local computing, another device,
or the central cloud. In [4], the authors proposed that a SU
can make a decision on whether to provide computing service
according to the social relationship with a DU.
The provision of computing services to others incurs re-
source consumption for rational providers, who may be only
willing to use resources for profit purposes. However, the
above works either consider UEs to be fully cooperative [1]-
[3][5] or the cooperation depends on their social relations
[4]. In this paper, we propose an incentive scheme based
on Bertrand game [6] to address the above-mentioned issue.
Bertrand game is widely used to analyze price competition
behavior and product sales share of buyer’s market. Compared
to existing works, the main contribution of this paper includes:
1) By modeling DUs as resource buyers and SUs as re-
source sellers, a Bertrand game is proposed to solve the
incentive problem in cooperative computing framework.
2) When the states and actions of all users are observable
(known as the complete information hypothesis), the NE
of the game is solved in closed-form. In the case of
incomplete information, an effective distributed iterative
algorithm is proposed to search the NE of the game.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider that there are a set M = {1, · · · ,M} of M
UEs and each pair of the UEs can communicate with each
other directly. A discrete time model is considered and let
t = 1, 2, · · · denote the consecutive time slots. The duration
of a time slot is denoted by T . In any slot t, UE m (∀m ∈ M)
has a computing task to be executed, which is characterized
by a tuple of two parameters ϕm = (Lm, Cm), where Lm (in
Mb) is the amount of the task input data and Cm (in CPU
cycles/Mb) is the required number of CPU cycles to complete
each megabit data [3]. Let fmaxm denote the maximum operating
frequency of the CPU of UE m. In order to complete task ϕm
within a time slot, the CPU frequency is set to fm =
CmLm
T
(0 < fm ≤ fmaxm ) by UE m. Let κm denote the effective
capacitance coefficient of the CPU of UE m. The energy spent







, ∀m ∈ M. (1)
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We consider the situation of buyer’s market. Let m = 0
denote the unique DU in the system. The other UEs in set
M−{0} are the potential SUs for the DU. We also define a
new set N = {1, · · · , N} ⊆ M− {0} to represent the set of
SUs that actually provide computing service to the DU.
A. Energy consumption of the DU
The energy consumption of the DU consists of the following
two parts. The first part of energy is used to transmit the task
data to the SUs in set N in slot t − 1, and the second part
of energy is used to execute the remaining task locally in
slot t. Note that the above system settings allows task data
transmission and task computing to be carried out in parallel.
In slot t−1, we assume that any SU i in set N is allocated
equal time for receiving the task data, which is given by
tn = T/ |N | , ∀n ∈ N . (2)
Let pn0 denote the transmit power of the DU for uploading
task data to SU n. Let gn0 denote the channel gain from the
DU to SU n. Then, the achievable data rate is given by








, ∀n ∈ N , (3)
where B is the channel bandwidth of the system, and σ2 is
the noise power at the receiver of the SU.
The unique DU in the system is denoted by m = 0. Then
L0 denotes the amount of task input data of the DU. Let
ln0 (0 ≤ l
n
0 ≤ L0) denote the amount of task data that the
DU decides to offload to SU n. To ensure correct reception,
condition rn0 tn ≥ l
n
0 should be satisfied. By substituting eq.










, ∀n ∈ N . (4)
Then, the energy spent by the DU for task offloading in slot





Assume that the CPU of the DU always works at the highest
frequency fmax0 , although the task may be offloaded, it still
needs to complete other new tasks. Hence, the energy spent












B. Energy consumption of each SU
The energy consumed by any SU n in set N consists of
the following two parts. The first part is used by SU n for
receiving the task data of the DU in slot t− 1. Let precn denote
the power of the receiver circuit of SU n. This part of energy
consumption is given by
Erecn = p
rec
n tn, ∀n ∈ N . (7)
After decoding the task data of the DU, SU n has to raise
the CPU frequency in slot t to complete its own task ϕn and
the DU’s task of ln0 Mb within slot t. By using eq. (1), we









, ∀n ∈ N . (8)
Since the size of the execution result is small, the energy
spent by SUs for feeding back the result is negligible.
III. GAME FORMULATION
Our objective is to motivate rational UEs to participate in
cooperative computing framework. Therefore, the following
questions should be answered [7]: 1) who to cooperate, i.e.,
to determine which SUs are in set N , and 2) how to cooperate,
i.e., to determine how much resource a SU in set N provides
to the DU and how much it can benefit from the provision.
Next, we propose a Bertrand game based incentive scheme to
address these issues.
In the proposed game, the DU is modeled as a buyer who
aims to use minimal payment to maximize energy savings.
Generally, the benefits of a player in a game is quantified
by utilities. Let qn represent the energy pricing of SU n for
providing computing resources to perform 1 Mb computing
tasks of the DU. According to [6], the following function is






























where the first term represents the energy saving for the DU
when it performs cooperative computing (offloading partial
computing task to the SUs) rather than performing the entire
task locally, the second term represents the total payment of
the DU to all the selected cooperative SUs, and, thus the
difference between the first term (the income of the DU)
and the second term (the cost of the DU) just represents the
profit that the DU can obtain under the proposed cooperative
computing framework. Additionally, the utility function also
takes the resource substitutability (RS) into account in the third
term as in [6]. RS is an ability of a resource demander to
substitute one resource (hold by some oligopolies) with other
resources (hold by other oligopolies) of similar functionality
[8]. Parameter v ∈ [0, 1] represents the RS. When v = 0,
there is no substitutability between resources sold by different
oligopolies, when v = 1, the resource sold by different
oligopolies are completely homogeneous with each other. For
example, when a DU is faced with multiple SUs to offload the
computing task, if special hardware or software are needed to
perform the task, the RS of different SUs is weak, namely
v tends to 0; otherwise, the computing task of the DU can
be performed in any configured hardware or software system,
namely, the computing resources of different SUs have a strong
RS, so v tends to 1. The RS has also been used by the authors
in [7] to address the spectrum allocation problem in multi-user
cognitive radio networks.
The SUs in the game are modeled as sellers who aim to
not only earn the payment to offset the energy consumption
3
for resource provision but also gain as much extra profits as









n )) , ∀n ∈ N , (10)
where the first term represents the revenue that SU n can
receive from the DU, the second term represents the extra
energy consumed by SU n when providing computing and
communication resources to the DU rather than solely per-
forming its own task, and thus, the difference between the
first term (the income of SU n) and the second term (the cost
of SU n) just represents the profit that SU n can obtain under
the proposed cooperative computing framework.
Let π =
(






q1, · · · , q|N |
)
denote
the strategy profile of the DU and the SUs in the game,
respectively. The DU and each of the SUs aim to maximize
their utilities in the game by choosing the optimal strategy.




s.t. 0 ≤ ln0 ≤ L0, ∀n ∈ N , (11.1)
∑
n∈N
ln0 ≤ L0, (11.2)
pn0 ≤ P, ∀n ∈ N , (11.3)
where constraint (11.2) ensures that the amount of the of-
floaded data does not exceed the total amount of task data
of the DU in any slot t, and constraint (11.3) ensures that
the transmit power of the DU does not exceed the maximum
allowable power P . The objective of SU n is formulated as
max
qn
Un, ∀n ∈ N (12)
s.t. qn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (12.1)
Cn(Ln + l
n
0 )/T ≤ f
max
n , ∀n ∈ N , (12.2)
where constraint (12.1) ensures a positive unit-price, and con-
straint (12.2) is the maximum computational power constraint.
Obviously, the DU and the SUs have conflict objectives in
the game. The objective is to find the NE of the game, at which
no user can achieve better utility by unilaterally violating the
NE strategy profile {π̂, ρ̂}.
IV. SOLUTION OF THE GAME
In the formulated Bertrand game, the amount of resource
that the DU buys is determined by the pricing of the SUs,
and vice versa. Additionally, the pricing strategy qn of SU n
is affected not only by its own available resource but also by
the pricing of the other SUs in set N , which is represented
by ρ−n =
(
q1, · · · , qn−1, qn+1, · · · , q|N |
)
. Next, with the
complete information hypothesis, that is, the strategies of all
the UEs are observable, we try to solve the NE strategy profile
{π̂, ρ̂} of the game. The main methods are given below.
1) Given the pricing strategy ρ of the SUs, the DU can
obtain the optimal strtegy π̂ by solving problem (11).
2) After obtaining π̂, the SUs in set N can obtain their
optimal pricing strategy ρ̂ by solving problem (12).
A. Optimal Resource Purchase of the DU
In this step, we solve problem (11) by using given pricing





0 > L0 is allowed, which means that
the DU can buy additional computing resources beyond the
demand L0 from the SUs. This constraint will be dealt with
in Sec. IV. C, where the active SU set N is determined.
In order to obtain the analytic solution of problem (11), one




























where A = κ0(f
max
0 )
2C0, H1 = ln 2
1







σ2T/|N | are constants. The derivation
is detailed in Appendix A.





= 0. Then, the optimal solution of problem (11)
is obtained as
l̂n0 = [αn − βnqn]
Q1n
0 , ∀n ∈ N , (14)

























































H2/gn0 − v + 1
are constants when all qk are known for ∀k ∈ N and k 6= n,
and [x]ba = max (min(x, b), a).
B. Optimal Pricing Strategies of the SUs
By substituting the solution of problem (11) given in eq.
(14) into problem (12), problem (12) is rewritten as
max
qn












∀n ∈ N (15)
s.t. qn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (15.1)
Cn(Ln + l̂n0 )/T ≤ f
max
n , ∀n ∈ N . (15.2)
By combining eq. (14) and constraint (15.2), we can get the
more accurate range of l̂n0 as
l̂n0 = [αn − βnqn]
Qn
0 , (16)




















which means that SU n cannot benefit by choosing prices
higher than αnβn or lower than
αn−Qn
βn
. Next, in order to solve
problem (12), we give the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1. When l̂n0 = αn − βnqn and qn satisfies condition
(17), Un is concave with respect to qn.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
According to Lemma 1, one can differentiate Un with
respect to qn and let
∂Un
∂qn
= 0. Then, the optimal solution
































T 2 . The derivation is in Appendix C.
C. Algorithm Implementation
In this section, we first consider the complete information
game (CIG), in which the channel state information (CSI) of
the UEs, the pricing strategy of the SUs, and the resource
purchase of the DU are all observable to the UEs. It is noted
that the pricing qn of each SU n is the function of g
n
0 , i.e.,
the CSI between it and the DU. Therefore, the SU selection
and scheduling algorithm requires to obtain the CSI via the
dedicated feedback channel. According to the hierarchical
structure of the game, we propose an iterative algorithm to
find the NE strategy profile {π̂, ρ̂} of the CIG which is given
in Algorithm 1. We use i = 1, 2, · · · to represent an index
sequence of the number of iterations. In the ith iteration, we
use qn[i], ρ−n[i] and π[i] to represent the pricing of SU n, the
pricing of the SUs in set N other than SU n, and the resource
purchase of the DU, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Solving CIG
1: Let i = 1. Initialize the pricing of the SUs in set N as ρ[i].
2: The SUs broadcast their CPU parameters fmaxn to the DU.
3: With the given ρ[i], the DU obtain the optimal resource purchase
π[i] by using eq. (16).
4: repeat
5: For each SU n in set N , after collecting π[i] from the DU and
ρ−n[i] from the other SUs in set N , SU n obtains its optimal
pricing qn[i] by using eq. (18).
6: For the DU, after collecting ρ[i] from the SUs in set N , it
obtains the optimal resource purchase π[i] by using eq. (16).
7: Each SU can obtain the gradient of its utility ∇Un[i](qn[i])
8: Update i = i+ 1.
9: until ‖∇Un[i](qn[i])‖ ≤ ǫ ‖∇Un[i− 1](qn[i− 1])‖ , ∀n ∈ N
Considering the system is composed of one DU and two
SUs, the convergence condition of Algorithm 1 is analyzed
in the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Algorithm 1 can converge to a stable point
{π[i] = π̂, ρ[i] = ρ̂} as the number of iterations i increases.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix D.
The convergence speed of Algorithm 1 mainly depends
on the choice of the convergence threshold ǫ. Since Un(qn)
is strictly concave with respect to qn, according to [9], the
general upper bound on the number of iterations of Algorithm
1 to reach a certain convergence threshold ǫ is O (log(1/ǫ)).
For example, when the initial price is chosen arbitrarily from
the feasible domain and the threshold ǫ is set to 10−3,
Algorithm 1 converges to a stable point after 10 iterations.
It agrees to the simulation results as shown in Fig. 1. In
addition to the CSI, the implementation of Algorithm 1 also
requires the DU and SUs to exchange {π[i], ρ[i]} in any ith
iteration. However, this information is private and difficult
to obtain in practical application. Next, we consider a more
realistic incomplete information game (ICIG), in which the
only information available for any SU n to make decision is
ln0 (i), that is the amount of resource purchased by the DU
from SU n in any ith iteration.
Next, we propose a distributed iterative algorithm based on
projected gradient descent (PGD) [10] to find the NE of the
ICIG. Firstly, we define
∂Un
∂qn
≈ Un (qn[i] + δ)− Un (qn[i]− δ)
2δ
, ∀n ∈ N , (19)
where δ is a sufficiently small positive number (e.g., δ =
10−5). According to the rules of PGD, any SU n should adjust
its strategy in the direction that maximizes its own utility
but not beyond the feasible domain. According to constraint
(12.1), we define the feasible domain of the pricing strategies
of the SUs as X = {x|x ≥ 0}. Then, the price update strategy
for SU n in any ith iteration is designed as


















, ∀n ∈ N ,
(20)
where an is the adjustment speed (i.e., learning rate). The
convergence of the PGD is analyzed in [10], thus omitted here.
The last issue to be addressed is to apply constraint (11.2)
to the game, that is, to determine which SUs are in set N
and solve the problem of who to cooperate. One simple and
straightforward approach is to initialize N = M−{0}. After
performing the game, one can make the following choices
according to the obtained NE. If the NE satisfies constraint
(11.2) and ln0 > 0 for ∀n ∈ N , the algorithm terminates and
the NE is taken as the final solution of the game. Otherwise,
the SU with the highest price is removed from set N , and the
game is performed again until constraint (11.2) is satisfied or
set N is empty. Since the the elements of the potential SU
set M−{0} is limited, this algorithm is bound to terminates.
The detail of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 SU selection algorithm
Input: The potential SUs set M− {0} for the DU.
Initialization: Let N = M−{0}.
2: repeat
Perform the game and obtain the NE {π̂, ρ̂} of the game.





0 > L0 then






0 ≤ L0 and ln0 > 0 for ∀n ∈ N , or N = ∅.
Output: The active SU set N for the DU.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulations, the system parameters are set as below.
The duration of a time slot is T = 0.2 s. The system bandwidth
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is B = 1 MHz. All the UEs are with the same switch
capacitance coefficient κm = 10
−28. The number of CPU
cycles required to execute megabit data is Cm = 8 × 108.
To complete the computing task in slot t, the maximum CPU
frequencies allocated by the DU and SU n are fmax0 = 2.4 GHz
and fmaxn = 1.5 GHz, respectively. The maximum transmit
power of the DU is P = 0.1 W. The power of the receiving
circuit of SU n is precn = 0.01 W. The path loss gain is set to
0.001/d3 (where d is the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver (in meters)). The noise power at the receiver of
a SU is σ2 = 10−9. The substitutability factor for the DU’s
utility function is set to v = 0.5.
To testify the convergence of the proposed algorithms, we
place one DU at coordinate (0, 0), and two SUs at coordinates
(−20, 20) and (20, 20), respectively. The amount of task data
of the DU and the SUs are set to L0 = 0.6 Mb, L1 = 0.15Mb,
and L2 = 0 Mb, respectively. Fig. 1 shows the convergence
of the price of the SUs with the increase of iteration numbers.
















Price of SU 1 in the CIG
Price of SU 1 in the ICIG, a 1=0.1
Price of SU 1 in the ICIG, a 1=0.2
Price of SU 2 in the CIG
Price of SU 2 in the ICIG, a 2=0.1
Price of SU 2 in the ICIG, a 2=0.2
Stable point
Fig. 1. The convergence to the NE price.
From Fig. 1, one can see that Algorithm 1 requires only
a few iterations to converge to the NE in the CIG. Whereas,
in the ICIG, the convergence speed depends largely on the
learning rate ai in eq. (20). When the learning rate is properly
set, e.g., a1 = a2 = 0.2, the ICIG converges to the NE
as fast as the CIG. In addition, we note that SU 2 has a
price advantage over SU 1, because SU 2 is with more idle
computing resources than SU 1 in the current slot.
Next, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively show the convergence
of the amount of offloaded data from the DU to the SUs and
the convergence of their utilities in the ICIG.

























The workload offloaded to SU 1 in the ICIG, a 1=0.1
The workload offloaded to SU 1 in the ICIG, a 1=0.2
The workload offloaded to SU 2 in the ICIG, a 2=0.1
The workload offloaded to SU 2 in the ICIG, a 2=0.2
Fig. 2. The convergence of the
amount of offloaded workload.












The utility of DU
The utility of SU 1
The utility of SU 2
Fig. 3. The convergence of user
utilities.
From Fig. 2, one can see that SU 2 accepts more computing
tasks of the DU than SU 1 in the game. This indicates that the
proposed pricing game can coordinate the resource supply of
the SUs according to their current available resources. From
Fig. 3, one can see that all the DU and SUs obtain positive
utilities from the game. Since SU 2 sells more resources than
SU 1, it obtains a higher utility than SU 1. It implies that the
proposed game provides sufficient motivation to rational users
to participate in cooperative computation.
Finally, we simulate a system consisting of one DU and
three SUs. The coordinates of the DU and SUs are (0, 0),
(−20, 20), (20, 20) and (20,−20), respectively. The amount
of task data of SUs 1 and 2 are L1 = 0.15 Mb and L2 = 0.1
Mb, respectively. We increase the workload of SU 3 from 0
Mb to 0.15 Mb at a step of 0.05 Mb. Fig. 4 shows the variation
of the amount of task data offloaded from the DU to the SUs.
0Mb 0.05Mb 0.1Mb 0.15Mb


























The offloaded task from the DU
DU
SU 1's own task
DU
SU 2's own task












Fig. 4. The workload distribution on the users.
From Fig. 4, one can see that with the increase of the
workload of SU 3, the amount of task data offloaded from
the DU to SU 3 decreases gradually. At the same time, the
workloads offloaded from the DU to SU 1 and SU 2 have
a small increase. It indicates that the proposed game can
coordinate the resource provision of the SUs according to their
current available resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an incentive scheme based on Bertrand game
has been proposed to stimulate rational users to participate
in cooperative computation framework. When the game is
with complete information, the NE of the game is obtained
in closed-form, while in the case of incomplete information, a
distributed iterative algorithm has been developed to find the
NE. Simulation results have verified the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF FUNCTION (13)
A Maclaurin series is a function which has expansion series
that gives the sum of derivatives of that function. In order to
obtain the analytic solution of problem (11), we derive the
Maclaurin series of the second term of function (9) up to order















































































where A = κ0(f
max
0 )
2C0, H1 = ln 2
1
BT/|N| σ2T/|N |, H2 =
(ln 2
1
BT/|N| )2σ2T/|N | are constants.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We take the first order derivative of Un in eq. (15) with
respect to qn, and we have
∂Un
∂qn














Since l̂n0 = αn − βnqn is considered, we have
∂Un
∂qn





Next, we further derive the second order derivative of eq.
(15) with respect to qn as
∂2Un
∂q2n



















< 0. Therefore, we conclude that the utility
function Un of SU n is concave with respect to qn.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF EQUATION (18)
Solving function ∂Un∂qn = 0 is equivalent to solving the
following quadratic equation
αn − 2βnqn + 3Fnβn(Ln + αn − βnqn)
2 = 0. (S.6)
By solving eq. (S.6), one can get the following two solu-
tions, i.e.,
qn = µn,1 =
3LnFnβn + 3Fnαnβn + 1 +
√




qn = µn,2 =
3LnFnβn + 3Fnαnβn + 1−
√
6FnLnβn + 3Fnαnβn + 1
3Fnβ2n
(S.8)




means that this solution is beyond the range of feasible prices,
resulting in the amount of input data of the offloaded task
being 0 and, hence, Un = 0. So equation (S.6) has the unique
solution qn = µn,2. For easy expression, we define µn = µn,2.
Then we have qn = µn.
Now, we determine the solution of problem (15) according
to the feasible price range where µn is located.
• If µn <
αn−Qn
βn
, Un is monotonically decreasing with
respect to the qn over the feasible price range. So the




• If αn−Qnβn ≤ µn ≤
αn
βn
, the optimal price is q̂n = µn.
• If µn >
αn
βn
, Un is monotonically increasing respect to






























PROOF OF LEMMA 2
According to eq. (18), we can obtain the self-mapping
function of SU n as









































By definition, the self-mapping function (S.10) is stable if
and only if the eigenvalues λn of J are all inside the unit
circle of the complex plane, i.e., |λn| < 1.
Next, we derive the expression of the elements of J as






































































µ2 [i] ≥ α2[i]β2
(S.14)
In eq. (S.13) and eq. (S.14), we have
ζ1 = 6L1F1β1 + 3F1α1β1 + 1, (S.15)

























Then, we know J1,2 < 1 and J2,1 < 1.
Since all the elements of J are less than one, the eigenvalues








which indicates that the eigenvalues λn are all inside the
unit circle of the complex plane. Therefore, Algorithm 1 can
converge to a stable point.
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